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BOOK REVIEWS
STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. Attorney-General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure. Washington, D. C.: Department of Justice,
1940.
MONOGRAPH No. 1, THE WALSH-HEALEY ACT.
When it is remembered that the Attorney General's Committee was
undertaking a survey of the procedure of all governmental agencies, the
inclusion of the Division of Public Contracts is understandable. Why this
bureau, which polices the Walsh-Healey Act, was made the subject of
Monograph No. 1 remains, however, a question to conjure with. It has
been comparatively obscure, a veritable recluse when contrasted with the
more illustrious Securities and Exchange Commission or the notorious
Labor Relations Board. Its primacy can certainly not be rested upon the
fact that it has served as the battleground for litigation. There is no
Jones & Laughlin,' Electric Bond & Share,2 or Morgan case3 to give it
immortality. In fact, scrutiny of the federal court reports reveals that the
Division of Public Contracts is a judicial anonymity.
How then can we account for its preferred status? Perhaps this is the
method adopted by the Committee to pay its respects to the now defunct
N. I. R. A., the most spectacular of the government bureaus while it lasted.
The Walsh-Healey Act was the first edifice Congress constructed out of the
debris left by the Schechter case.4 More probable is it that the Committee,
seeking to commence its endeavors on a quiet plane, selected for a starter an
agency which has been free from attack.
It should not be assumed from the foregoing that the Division of Public
Contracts does not deal with problems of vital human interest. Briefly
stated, the Walsh-Healey Act provides that, in every government contract,
involving ten thousand dollars or more, for the purchase of supplies and
materials, conditions shall be inserted stating that no individual will be
employed for more than eight hours per day or forty hours per week,
except as permitted by the Secretary of Labor; that convict labor will not
be used; that boys under the age of sixteen years and girls under the age
of eighteen will not be employed in work relating to the execution of the
contract; that working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or
dangerous to the health and safety of employees engaged in performing the
contract will not be permitted; and that minimum wages, determined by the
Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing minimum wages for persons em-
ployed on similar work in the locality, will be paid. Child labor, minimum
w ages, maximum hours, and working conditions are all affected by the
statute. And these are fighting issues.
There are several reasons why the administrators of the Walsh-Healey
1. (1936) .301 U. S. 1.
2. (1937) 303 U. S. 419.
3. (1938) 204 U. S. 1; (1936) 298 U. S. 468.
4. (19315) 295 U. S. 495.
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Act have escaped the conventional epithets and consequently also the head-
lines. Before the statute was passed, the position of the government was
paradoxical. On the one hand, it was urging, and for a time attempting to
-compel, industry to improve working conditions; on the other, it was letting
public contracts to the lowest bidder, a practice which, unless minimum
standards were prescribed, inevitably hurt labor. The Walsh-Healey Act
enabled the government to escape from this anomaly and to save face.
Aside perhaps from the issue of undue delegation of power, opponents of
the legislation could not marshal constitutional arguments to support their
-cause. The question of federalism was not involved. The government was
not qua government attempting to regulate industry, something which it
could not do-at that time; it was merely conditioning its favors, the letting
of public contracts, on compliance with specified conditions. Only those
who sought the bounty were affected by the restraint. What the government
could not do as government, it could always do, just as could any private
citizen, as purchaser. 5 Moreover, there was ample precedent for the Walsh-
Healey Act. The use by the government of contracts to effect a measure of
control over industry had been employed in the Eight Hour Law of 1892 and
the Bacon-Davis Act of 1931.
Equally as important in quieting opposition was the fact that the Walsh-
Healey Act emerged, as a result of debate and amendment, a compromise
measure whose frame of reference was extremely narrow. But a small
segment of industry is affected by the statute. Only those concerns which
seek, and are successful in obtaining, government contracts requiring the
manufacture and furnishing of supplies come under its terms; and then
only for the duration of the contract, while the work for the government is
actually in progress. If the sum involved is less than ten thousand dollars,
or if the materials are such as can be purchased on the "open market" (a
term of as yet uncertain meaning), the act does not apply. Even when it
does, the Secretary of Labor is given broad powers to permit deviations
from the strict terms of the contract.
It is for this reason that the Act has been labelled innocuous. "Legisla-
tion of this type may even be thought to react adversely upon the interests
of labor by absorbing political effort which might be more fruitfully di-
rected elsewhere."' In mild contrast, the Attorney General's Committee
concludes, however: "The regulative force of the law may not be incon-
siderable." 7
The social and economic implications of the Walsh-Healey Act are not,
however, the concern of the Attorney General's Committee. The monograph
does not purport to consider the success or failure of this effort at using
the leverage of government purchasing power to raise labor standards
generally; nor even to record the worth-whileness of the attempt. Given
the statute, the Committee limited itself to a study of the procedural frame-
5. Atkin v. Kansas (1903) 191 U. S. 207; Ellis v. United States (1907)
206 U. S. 246.
6. Legislation (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 102, 121.
7. P. 3.
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work set up by it. Suggestions are advanced in aid of more effective
administration.
From the moment when a government investigator sends in his report,
or an employee or rival of the contractor communicates his grievance to the
Division, until the time when the Secretary of Labor has finally rendered
his decision, few details escape the Committee's searching gaze. Thus, the
adequacy of the present sanctions which implement the statute is questioned.
The Committee places the stamp of approval upon a pending amendment
permitting the recovery of double or treble damages, as being the sorely
needed intermediate sanction between the extremely lenient remedy of
restitution and the ruinous, and hence rarely used, penalty of blacklisting.
The standard type of complaint drafted by the Division is criticized. Being
too general, it fails to apprise the respondent of the acts or omissions which
allegedly constitute violations of the Act. Better results would be achieved
by the use of a more detailed complaint subject to later amendments. "As
matters stand, a respondent may be forced to submit to the expense and
publicity of a hearing in order to ascertain the scope of accusations which,
if detailed in advance, might have been disposed of by conference or by
admission of guilt."s The Committee is on the alert even to point out the
possibility of reducing costs. Transcripts must be purchased at the rate of
thirty cents per page from the official reporter. Since respondents already
have copies of the complaint and answer in their possession, savings might
be obtained by eliminating these documents from the transcript.
A high standard of objectivity is maintained throughout the monograph.
A few examples will suffice. The Division has adopted a very liberal prac-
tice with regard to the participation in the hearings of interested parties.
Notices are sent to all the employees of the contractor who is being investi-
gated and to the unions which represent them; they may testify or file
briefs. The Committee takes the position that "the Division's broad and
informal invitation to all-comers to appear" makes for the "intrusion of
irrelevancies."' Formal applications to intervene should be required. Im-
mediately, however, it is admitted that the suggested procedure is superior
in theory only; that no abuse has been discernible in the present method,
because of the fact that potential witnesses have always communicated with
the Division in advance of the hearing, and there has been an opportunity
at a conierence to discourage the attendance of those who have no useful
information to offer testimonially. Finally, it is conceded that some loss
might ensue upon adoption of the Committee's proposal, since the addition
of formalities might tend to discourage the participation of the legally
untutored.
In connection with the proposal that a more detailed complaint should
be used, the Committee notes that even under the present practice the
issues are formulated before the hearing. This is accomplished by means of
a pre-trial conference at which frank disclosure is made of the case the
) ivision expects to prove. Although the Committee adheres to the belief
8. Pp. 17-18.
9. P. 15.
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that the change it advances would be beneficial, it takes pains to point out
that the Division has in general fashioned a rough sort of procedure, on
the whole well adapted to solve its problems and to afford fullest expression
to the persons who appear before it. In no instance does the Committee
erect a straw man who can be undermined at the proper time.
What prevents the monograph from being a real contribution, however,
is the failure of the Committee to localize the Division of Public Contracts,
to define its relationship to the other governmental agencies and to the
courts. The impression is gained that the administrative procedure of this
bureau has been broken down into bits and separately considered. Thus,
the laxity in permitting interventions is found likely to prove embarrassing;
or more detail in the complaint is thought desirable. But generalization in
terms of a process is wanting.
It is not that the Committee has evaluated the practices of the agency
according to judicial standards. The method of having a trial attorney sift
the record for the Administrator on an appeal from the decision of the
trial examiner is criticized, it is true. The Administrator, it is suggested,
would be better advised by a neutral assistant. But, techniques are not
denounced merely because they may deviate from the norm of the court-
room. For example, the Committee notes that trial examiners have been
advised by their superiors not to grant a motion to dismiss. Justification
for the mandate is found in the costly duplication of effort entailed if the
trial examiner were to halt proceedings only to be reversed by the Admin-
istrator's later ruling that the case must be heard on its merits. Chitty and
Shipman to the contrary notwithstanding, in not one instance in the history
of the Division has this rule been flouted. To do so would (to use the
Committee's words) "be an act of heroism-and very probably an im-
provident exercise of discretion."' 01 Or, to cite another instance, it is urged
that, on review from a decision of the Administrator to the Secretary of
Labor where the penalty of blacklisting has been imposed, the latter might
well consult with the former even though "a judge's exercise of discretion
in imposing sentence will be considered by an appellate court only in ex-
ceptional circumstances."' 1
It is rather that too many important questions are left unanswered. Is
the same type of hearing required of this agency as of the others by the
second Morgan case? Should not the fact that, on resort to the courts, a
decision of the Division is only conclusive-even on the facts-if it is
supported by a "preponderance of the evidence" ("substantial evidence" is
not enough) affect our answer? Apparently, a trial de novo in the Courts
is contemplated. Is the fact that Congress could conceivably make the
Division the final arbiter of a violation of the terms of a public contract of
importance? Such legislation might well be upheld as a proper use of
contractual conditions. Finally, what significance should be attached to
the fact that functionally the bureau resembles a police agency rather than
a department with affirmative regulatory powers?
10. P. 2S.
11. P. 43.
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Nowhere is the Committee's sin of omission more evident than in the
description of the relationship between trial attorney and trial examiner-
prosecutor and judge-when they are sent on the road to try a case. Both,
it should be remembered, are taken from the Division's legal roster of four-
teen men. The two are answerable to a common superior. They have per-
haps shared the same office in Washington. At the very least, the extent
of their contacts must have been considerable. But once they are assigned
to duty, the relationship is "turned off" by administrative order. For
reasons of economy, they may, to be sure, use the same long distance tele-
phone connection to report to their chief. But, the Division's rules require
the trial examiner and trial attorney to hold no conferences during the
course of a hearing unless a representative of the respondent is present.
They may not lodge at the same hotel, "and this requirement is not relaxed
even when the hearing is held in places boasting only one reasonably com-
fortable hostelry."'1 Whether the rule of first come first served in such a
case has received the stamp of administrative approval, we are not told.
Perhaps the negative answer is to be inferred from the statement that the
bureau has succeeded in surrounding the trial examiner at the hearing with
"an aura of judicial respectability." 3 On another day, the trial attorney
will have his chance to play the role of judge and to gain the comfortable
lodging.
Plainly there is much of the farcical in this process. If the assumption
is that objectivity can be induced by the simple expedient of separating,
for one or two days, men who work in close proximity all year round, it is
based on poor psychology. If such squirming is thought required for due
process, it is probably now based also on poor law. The crudity of the
procedure seems to imply either a misunderstanding of the second Morgan
case or the adolescent stage of administrative organization. Yet, the
Committee, after describing the practice in the Division disavows any
intention of implying that the "separation of the trial examiner from the
trial attorney during the course of the hearing is a mere humbug."' 4 And,
it is later averred that no attempt will be made here to determine whether,
in the circumstances of an administrative organization like the Division of
Public Contracts, there are elements which render inapposite the trans-
planting of the traditions and the customs associated with the judiciary.
That the Committee recognized the existence of the problem is clear.
That it did not deal with it is unfortunate. Perhaps it was felt that such a
subject could be best treated in a unifying volume after the separate agen-
cies were first discussed. Since the solution of this question is basic and
furnishes the key to the problems of detail encountered in the procedure of
each agency, rendering apt or inept the suggestions of the Committee, the
problem would have been better handled in this and in every other mono-
graph.
With the hot breath of the Supreme Court on their shoulders, the mem-
12. P. 31.
13. P. 31.
14. P. 32.
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hers of the Attorney General's Committee should not be blamed unduly for
refusing to venture an opinion. In times of change, the prophet's role is a
thankless one. That the answers to the questions we have raised will
shortly be forthcoming, if not from the Committee then from the Supreme
Court, seems apparent from the significant utterance of that body in
Federal Communications Comm. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.15: "These
differences in origin and function preclude wholesale transplantation of the
rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history
and experience of courts."
Already several of the proposals made by the Committee have been put
into effect by the Division of Public Contracts. At a time when other
critics would radically alter the structure or personnel of the various
governmental departments, or both, the path followed by the Attorney
General's Committee seems to be the one best designed to further the cause
of intelligent administration.
MILTON I. GOLDSTEIN.t
MONOGRAPH No. 3, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COmMIssIoN.
That in the series of monographs prepared by the Attorney-General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, the only one which runs to two
volumes should be the one dealing with the Federal Communciations Com-
mission, is perhaps a tribute not so much to the importance of that Com-
mission in the administrative scheme (although it is of the first impor-
tance), as to the variety and complexity of the matters which have been
committed to its jurisdiction by Congress. It is apparent also that the
monograph is more extended than it would have been had the Commission
and its procedure in the past not been the subject of sharp public criticism.
The monograph is divided into two parts, the first dealing with licensing
and adjudication, the second with rule-making. Subject to this division,
the monograph treats separately the diverse and often quite unrelated
fields over which the Commission has jurisdiction. These include broadcast
stations (standard, relay, international, facsimile, high frequency, experi-
mental and non-commercial educational); safety and common carrier radio
services (embracing marine, aviation, emergency, fixed public and fixed
public press services, the latter two being engaged in the common carriage
of communications for hire, either by means of radio-telephone or radio-
telegraph) ; commercial radio operators; amateur stations and operators;
and telephone and telegraph carriers.
The history of the regulation of communications by wire dates back to
the Post Roads Act of 1866, which related simply to the fixing of rates for
Government telegrams. The Act of August 7, 1888, commenced, to a very
limited extent, the regulation of telegraph carriers, the application of the
Act being restricted to subsidized carriers. The jurisdiction was placed in
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
15. (1940) 60 S. Ct. 437.
t Member of St. Louis, Missouri, Bar.
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